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Realizing the Dream: United States v. State of Louisiana
It is one thing to agree that the goal of integration is morally
and legally right; it is another thing to commit oneself positively
and actively to the ideal of integration-the former is intellectual
assent, the latter is actual belief. These are days that demand
practices to match professions. This is no day to pay lip service
to integration, we must pay life service to it.'
It has been over twenty years since Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
spoke these famous words. Yet today, we are still only paying lip service
to integration, especially in the area of higher education. It has been
thirty-five years since the United States Supreme Court held, in Brown
v. Board of Education,2 that the maintenance of "separate but equal"
educational institutions was unconstitutional. This holding was based on
earlier decisions by the Supreme Court declaring that separate institutions
of higher education for blacks and whites were unequal and therefore
unconstitutional.
At the time of Brown almost all of the states had either de jure
or de facto separate educational facilities for whites and blacks. Louisiana
was one of those states. In fact, it was one of Louisiana's laws that
originally led the Supreme Court to uphold the "separate but equal"
doctrine.' The feeling that whites and blacks should not mix was deeply
rooted in both the black and white segments of society.
For the past fifteen years the desegregation of Louisiana's system
of higher education has produced ongoing litigation. On August 2, 1988, 4
a three-judge panel held that Louisiana was operating a dual system of
higher education and set a date to discuss possible remedies. On July
19, 1989,1 the court rendered its opinion and order to desegregate
Louisiana's system of higher education. A surprising part of the court's
plan calls for the merger of the law schools at L.S.U. and Southern
University. None of the parties had argued in favor of this merger nor
had they expected it.
This comment will discuss the court's order to merge the two law
schools. First, there will be a brief discussion of Louisiana's system of
Copyright 1990, by LOUISIANA LAW RmEVw.
1. C. King, The Words of Martin Luther King, Jr., at 40 (1987).
2. 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954) [hereinafter Brown 1].
3. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138 (1896).
4. United States v. State of Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. La. 1988).
5. United States v. State of Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. La. 1989).
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higher eduction as it existed in the past and as it currently stands with
respect to desegregation under the "freedom of choice" admissions
policy, specifically focusing on the public law schools at L.S.U. and
Southern University. The article will then discuss the basis for the court's
finding of liability. The article will conclude with a discussion of the
court's choice of remedies and why this writer thinks that the court's
decision was correct.
BACKGROUND
Louisiana's System of Higher Education
Prior to Brown, the State of Louisiana established and maintained
a dual system of higher education based upon race. Two of the major
institutions in the system were (and still are) Louisiana State University
(L.S.U.) and Southern University (Southern).
L.S.U. was established in 1859 and has been in continuous operation
since that time except for a short period during the Civil War. It was
established at a time when blacks were enslaved and were not allowed
to attend public schools. The Department of Law was established in
1906. Admission to the law school was limited to whites. From the time
of its establishment until 1950, it was the official policy of the L.S.U.
Board of Supervisors that no black students could attend the law school
at L.S.U.
Southern University was established in 1880, fifteen years after blacks
were emancipated in the Civil War. Admission was limited to blacks.
The Department of Law was established in 1947 pursuant to the State
Board of Education's recommendation that there be a bona fide law
school for blacks. 6
In 1950, the equality of the two law schools was challenged for the
first time in Wilson v. Board of Supervisors.7 Roy S. Wilson, a black
man, applied for admission to the L.S.U. Department of Law. His
application was timely and complied with all of the rules and regulations
governing the admission of students. Although he possessed all of the
qualifications required for admission, he was not accepted because Louis-
iana had established a law school for blacks at Southern. The Federal
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, finding that the two schools
were not equal in the ability to educate lawyers, held that, by denying
his application for admission, L.S.U. had violated Mr. Wilson's four-
teenth amendment right to equal protection.' Yet, even after this case,
6. See Wilson v. Board of Supervisors, 92 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. La. 1950).
7. Id. Wilson enrolled in the Fall of 1951 for non-credit courses. He never received
his grades and did not register again in the Spring of 1952.
8. Id. at 989.
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L.S.U. did not change its admission policy of excluding blacks. It was
not until some time after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
that Louisiana discontinued its official recognition of the state universities
as single race institutions. Despite this change in law, institutions of
higher learning in Louisiana have remained racially identifiable.
Louisiana's Current System of Legal Education
Louisiana currently has seventeen general state institutions of higher
learning governed by four separate boards. 9 The Board of Regents has
general responsibility for planning, coordinating and reviewing the budg-
ets and academic programs offered by each state institution. The re-
maining three boards have separate direct management authority for a
number of the universities. The Louisiana State University Board of
Supervisors ("L.S.U. Supervisors") oversees the L.S.U. system, including
the Paul M. Hebert Law Center on the main campus in Baton Rouge.' 0
The Southern University Board of Supervisors ("Southern Supervisors")
oversees the Southern University system, including the Southern Uni-
versity Law Center, also in Baton Rouge." Like the schools they ad-
minister, the governing boards have been and remain racially identifiable.
The Southern Board of Supervisors has four whites (22%) and fourteen
blacks (78%). The L.S.U. Board of Supervisors has four blacks (22%)
and fourteen whites (78%).12
The two law schools, however, present remarkably different racial
proportions. As of 1988, the Southern Law Center had a student pop-
ulation that was 58% black and 42% white. On the other hand, the
L.S.U. Law Center is almost totally a one-race institution with a student
population that is 96% white and 4% black. The present percentage of
blacks is higher than it has been at any time during the Consent Decree,
when the percentage was consistently 1%.13 The faculty at Southern Law
Center is equally staffed between white and black professors, while at
9. See P. Verkuil, Special Master Final Report to the District Court, at 11 (1989)
[hereinafter Report].
10. The L.S.U. system includes Louisiana State University and Mechanical College
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University in Shreveport, Louisiana State University in
Alexandria, Louisiana State University in Eunice, and University of New Orleans.
II. The Southern system includes Southern University in Baton Rouge, Southern
University in New Orleans, and Southern University at Shreveport/Bossier City. The other
institutions are governed by the Board of Trustees for State Colleges and Universities.
They are Louisiana Tech University, Grambling State University, University of South-
western Louisiana, Northeast Louisiana University, Northwestern State University, South-
eastern Louisiana University, McNeese State University, Nicholls State University, and
Delgado Community College.
12. Report, supra note 9, at 14.
13. Statistical data compiled by the L.S.U. Law Center's admission office on No-
vember 2, 1989. A replica of this data is attached.
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L.S.U. there are only two blacks on the faculty, which is composed of
forty-two full time professors.
The two law schools also differ in many other respects, including
their admission standards. Both schools require that their applicants hold
an undergraduate degree from an accredited college or university. How-
ever, at L.S.U. applicants are also required to obtain a minimum index
based on their Law School Admission Test (LSAT) and undergraduate
grade point average.1 4 Presently, those applicants that obtain an index
of ninety-six are admitted. In contrast, Southern only requires that their
applicants have a minimum of a 2.0 ("C") average in courses having
"substantive academic content."' 5 The applicant must also have an
acceptable score on the LSAT.' 6
Events Leading Up to This Suit
In 1969-70, the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) examined ten states that had previously operated dual systems
of public higher education to determine whether their educational systems
had in fact become desegregated. 7 All were found to be operating dual
systems in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. HEW
requested that each of these states submit an acceptable plan for de-
segregation. Louisiana, claiming that it did not operate a dual system,
refused to do so.
On March 14, 1974, the United States Attorney General filed suit
against the State of Louisiana and the state agencies of higher education"
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.19 The United States claimed
that the State of Louisiana had established, maintained, and perpetuated
14. The index is the sum of the LSAT score multiplied by two and the undergraduate
GPA multiplied by 10. For example, an LSAT score of thirty-three and an undergraduate
GPA of 3.0 would produce an index of ninety-six (96). If the LSAT is taken more than
once, the highest LSAT score is used in computing the index.
15. The phrase "substantive academic content" is left undefined.
16. What is an "acceptable" score on the LSAT is also left undefined.
17. This was pursuant to Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C.), aff'd as
modified, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
18. United States v. State of Louisiana, 527 F. Supp. 509, 512 (1981). The original
defendants were the State of Louisiana, the Louisiana Board of Education, the Louisiana
Coordinating Council for Higher Education, and the Louisiana Board of Regents. In
March of 1986, following the restructuring of Louisiana's higher education boards by the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974, the parties jointly moved to substitute the following
defendants in place of the original named defendants: The State of Louisiana, the Board
of Regents, the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural and
Mechanical College, the Board of Supervisors of Southern University and Agricultural
and Mechanical College, and the Board of Trustees of State Colleges and Universities.
19. 42 U.S.C. 2000(d), 2000(d)-I (1982).
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an unlawful dual system of higher education based on race. The United
States sought to dismantle the dual system through a detailed deseg-
regation plan. A three-judge 20 panel was organized on April 16, 1974
to hear the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 228121 and 2284.22
On September 8, 1981,23 after seven years of pre-trial conferences
and negotiations, a Consent Decree was proposed by both parties. Sub-
sequently, on November 30, 1981, the court approved the Consent
Decree. According to the terms of the decree, the defendants committed
themselves to: (1) shaping the process of admissions and recruitment to
increase the number of "other-race" students,' 4 (2) solving the problem
of student attrition (especially with respect to "other-race" students), 25
(3) resolving the issues and problems arising out of program duplication,
and the allocation of program curricular offerings among the state's
institutions, 26 (4) understanding the appropriate role of historically black
colleges and making provisions for their enhancement, 27 and (5) taking
substantial steps to achieve a more equitable balance in the racial com-
position of the staff, faculty, and governing boards of the university
system. A timetable and goals were also set for increasing "other-race"
participation in every aspect of the university system's life. 2
Pursuant to these goals, the L.S.U. Law Center was to strive for
a minimum of 7.5% blacks in its student body by the 1987-88 school
term. 29 There was no particular goal set for the Southern University
Law Center. Both law centers were to actively seek applications from
qualified "other-race" students. There was no indication that any ac-
ademic standards would be changed. The Decree was effective until
December 31, 1987. The court's jurisdiction was to terminate on De-
cember 31, 1987, unless the United States moved to declare that Louis-
iana was in violation of the Decree.
The United States so moved in December 1987. In the papers filed
on that motion, all parties agreed that: (1) Louisiana had operated a
20. The panel consisted of John M. Wisdom (Circuit Judge), Charles Schwartz, Jr.,
and Veronica D. Wicker (District Judges).
21. Repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976).
22. 28 U.S.C. 2284 (1982) states:
(a) A district court of three judges shall be convened when otherwise required
by Act of Congress, or when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality
of the apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any
statewide legislative body.
23. United States v. State of Louisiana, 527 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. La. 1981).
24. Consent Decree, United States v. Louisiana, CA-80-3300, Aug. 29, 1981, at 5.
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id. at 14.
27. Id. at 17.
28. Id. at 15.
29. Id. at Table 3 (appendix).
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de jure segregated system of public higher education prior to the en-
actment of Title VI; (2) it had not implemented all the provisions of
the 1981 Consent Decree; and (3) almost all of the state's institutions
of higher education remained racially identifiable.30 The United States,
along with the predominantly black institutions in the state, argued that
unlawful vestiges of the state's former de jure segregated system will
remain unless the state spends the additional money contemplated under
the Decree. Louisiana responded that the full implementation of the
Decree would actually promote segregation,' and that Louisiana had
made sufficient good faith efforts to warrant a dismissal of the entire
suit.3 2
By a decree dated August 2, 1988, the three judges held that the
state's freedom of choice policy, allowing a student to choose which
college he would attend, was insufficient to demonstrate that Louisiana
was not operating an unlawful dual college system based upon race.
Noting that several of the schools were more segregated in 1987 than
they had been when the Consent Decree was entered in 1981, 31 the panel
declared the Decree ineffective. The court then found, by summary
judgment, that Louisiana was in violation of Title VI and set a date
to discuss the issue of other or additional remedies that would be required
to achieve a unitary system.
After further litigation, the court rendered an opinion and order,
dated July 19, 1989, 34 aimed at desegregating the higher education system
in Louisiana. Among others, the order called for the following actions:
1) The elimination of the four boards35 and organization of the
state's higher education system under one unified board.
2) The designation of Louisiana State University as the research
university in the state university system and recognition of it as
Louisiana's flagship university.3 6
3) Creation of a Community College system to insure remedial
education of those individuals who might be excluded from a
traditional four-year college system.1
7
4) Reduction of unwarranted duplicated programs, especially
legal education. The Court ordered the merger of the state's
30. United States v. State of Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642, 644 (E.D. La. 1988).
31. Louisiana argued that full implementation of the consent decree would only serve
to make the "black" schools more attractive to black students, which would result in a
less overall integrated university system.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 657.
34. United States v. State of Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. La. 1989).
35. Id. at 515.
36. Id. at 516.
37. Id. at 518.
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two public law schools located at Southern and L.S.U. The
newly merged law school was ordered to maintain a minimum
of 100o minority students.3"
All parties appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Justice Byron
White granted a temporary stay of the order. The full Court subsequently
made the stay permanent pending its decision as to whether it would
hear the case in its next term. On January 5, 1990, the Supreme Court
decided that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case and remanded
it to the Fifth Circuit.3 9
ANALYSIS
Does Brown Apply to Higher Education?
Prior to Brown, there were six U.S. Supreme Court cases involving
the "separate but equal" doctrine in the area of public education.
4 0
Four of these cases were concerned with higher education. In each case
inequality was found because there were specific benefits enjoyed by
white students that were denied to black students of the same educational
qualifications. Thus, in none of the cases did the Court find it necessary
to re-examine the constitutionality of the "separate but equal" doctrine
in order to grant the requested relief.
The most notable of these cases was Sweatt v. Painter.4 1 Herman
Sweatt applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School.
Although he possessed all of the academic qualifications for admission,
Sweatt's application was rejected solely because he was black. At the
time Sweatt submitted his application, Texas law did not permit blacks
and whites to go to school together, and there was no law school in
38. Id. at 514 and 518.
39. Louisiana, ex rel Guste v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 708 (1990); Board of
Supervisors of Southern University v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 708 (1990); Louisiana,
ex rel Roemer v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 708 (1990).
40. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 70 S. Ct. 851 (1950);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 S. Ct. 848 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332
U.S. 631, 68 S. Ct. 299 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.
Ct. 232 (1938); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 48 S. Ct. 91 (1927); and Cumming v.
Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528, 20 S. Ct. 197 (1899).
41. 339 U.S. 629, 70 S. Ct. 848 (1950). See also McKissick v. Carmichael, 187 F.2d
949 (4th Cir. 1951), another pre-Brown decision involving higher education. Plaintiff filed
suit seeking admission to the University of North Carolina School of Law. Plaintiff's
application, like Sweatt's, was denied because North Carolina's laws, as was the law in
Texas, prohibited blacks from attending school with whites. The Fourth Circuit stated:
"The duty of the federal courts, however, is clear. We must give first place to the rights
of the individual citizen, and when and where he seeks only equality of treatment before
the law, his suit must prevail." 187 F.2d at 954.
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Texas that admitted blacks. 42 Sweatt sued the university, seeking a writ
of mandamus to compel his admission. The State of Texas then estab-
lished an obviously inferior separate law school for blacks at Texas
Southern Law School. In requiring the University of Texas to admit
Sweatt to its law school, the Supreme Court declared, "petitioner may
claim his full constitutional right; legal education equivalent to that
offered by the State to students of other races. Such education is not
available to him in a separate law school as offered by the state." '43
In Sweatt the Court made special note of the following attributes
of law schools: (1) size and quality of the faculty, (2) size of the student
body, (3) size and quality of the library, and (4) availability of law
reviews, moot court facilities, scholarship funds, and Order of the Coif
affiliation." In these areas, the Court noted that "the University of
Texas Law School was superior to the newly formed law school" for
blacks.4 5 A comparison of the law schools at Southern and L.S.U. reveals
that in these respects, the disparity between the two schools is not as
great as in Sweatt.46 But the inquiry does not end here. The Sweatt
42. The state trial court recognized that the state violated Sweatt's constitutional right
of equal protection by depriving him of a legal education. However, the court continued
the case for six months to allow the state to supply a law school for blacks. At the end
of the six months, the trial court denied Sweatt's petition upon a showing by the state
that it had established a law school for blacks at Texas Southern University. Sweatt then
alleged that the two schools were not "equal." Finding that the new school offered Sweatt
the same privileges, advantages, and opportunities for the study of law that white students
enjoyed at the University of Texas, the trial court again dismissed Sweatt's suit. The
Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision and the Texas Supreme Court
denied plaintiff's writ of error. However, because of the important constitutional issues
involved, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Sweatt v. Painter, 338 U.S.
865, 70 S. Ct. 139 (1949).
43. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 635, 70 S. Ct. at 851.
44. Id. at 632, 70 S. Ct. at 849.
45. Id. at 633, 70 S. Ct. at 850.
46. The law library at L.S.U. is a comprehensive legal research facility. It has the
largest collection of materials in Louisiana, including computer-assisted legal research. The
library houses more than 460,000 volume equivalents, which include over 350,000 bound
volumes and some 550,000 microforms. It also holds about 90,000 court records, and its
current serial subscriptions exceed 4,600. The collection contains the statutes and reports
of federal and state jurisdictions in the United States, as well as extensive collections of
law journals, citators, digests, encyclopedias, and treatises. There are also substantial
collections of comparative, international, and foreign law, including materials from Europe,
Latin America, and countries of the British Commonwealth. Computer services provide
on line access to bibliographic and legal information databases, including Lexis, Westlaw,
and Stairs. The library is a U.S. government document depository and a Louisiana state
document depository for the records and briefs of the. Louisiana Supreme Court and the
Courts of Appeal.
Southern Law Library contains approximately 230,000 volumes and offers research
assistance and reference services to students, faculty, and the general public. The library
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Court went on to say that "[wIhat is more important, the University
of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater degree those qualities
which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for
greatness in a law school." ' 47 Some of these qualities enumerated by the
Court were: (1) reputation of the faculty, (2) position and influence of
the alumni, (3) standing in the community, (4) traditions, and (5) prestige. 41
There is no question of a great disparity between the two law schools
in favor of L.S.U.'s law school when these more important qualities
are considered.4
9
There are also some objective criteria available that further reveal
the disparity between the two law schools. For instance, L.S.U. graduates
consistently lead the state in bar passage rate with a 90% success rate
while Southern graduates have consistently remained below 50% in pas-
sage success.5 0 In terms of job placement L.S.U. graduates usually obtain
the better paying and more prestigious jobs.5 These considerations were
not available in the Sweatt case because the law school for blacks was
newly formed. Nevertheless, they do reflect the inequality in legal training
offered by the two law schools.
Post-Brown Developments
In Brown, the Court relied on language found in Sweatt to find
that there were several intangible qualities of a school that are incapable
of objective measurement that make for greatness in a school. By stating
that such principles apply with added force in elementary and secondary
is adequate to support the curriculum and conforms to the standards of the American
Bar Association and of the Association of American Law Schools. Both the federal and
the Louisiana State governments have designated the Southern University Law Library an
official depository for government documents. The library contains more than 450 titles
of periodicals with several more added each year. A collection of microforms and tapes
dealing with a wide range of legal subjects, as well as computerized research through
Westlaw is available.
Southern University Law School also has moot court and its own law review. Unlike
L.S.U.'s law school, however, it does not have a chapter of the Order of the Coif, a
national organization recognizing outstanding achievement in legal education.
47. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634, 70 S. Ct. at 850 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 634, 70 S. Ct. at 850.
49. In the past, the L.S.U. Law Center has had such renowned faculty members as
Wex Malone (deceased) and Paul M. Hebert (deceased), and currently, Professors William
Hawkland and Saul Litvinoff. The Law Center houses the Center for Civil Law Studies
and the Louisiana State Law Institute, both highly influential organizations which rec-
ommend laws to the state legislature. L.S.U. graduates are recognized for outstanding
legal training both within Louisiana and in surrounding states. Graduates from L.S.U.
are heavily recruited by law firms in Texas and other southern states as well as for judicial
clerkships with both the federal and state court systems.
50. U.S. v. State of Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499, 513 (E.D. La. 1989).
51. See infra text accompanying notes 98-99.
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schools, the Court implicitly recognized that these principles are appli-
cable to institutions of higher learning. The Supreme Court's school
desegregation opinions following Brown have all concerned primary and
secondary education. Nevertheless, the lower courts have also been con-
sistent in holding that this constitutional mandate to dismantle racially
dual systems applies in the higher education context as well.52 Hence,
the state's duty to eliminate the vestiges of state imposed segregation
is just as exacting in the context of higher education as it is in elementary
and secondary school systems.53 It is only the means of eliminating this
segregation which differs. The duty to remove all vestiges of de jure
segregation is the same . 4
Opponents of this view point out that, unlike primary and secondary
schools, no one is compelled to attend an institution of higher learning.
Thus, in higher education "freedom of choice" for the individual to
attend whatever institution he chooses is enough for equal protection
purposes. This distinction, however, while it may affect the specific
remedial actions that may be required, does not relieve the state of its
constitutional duty under the Fourteenth Amendment. This is so because
"the fundamental interests that support a State's police power in the
primary and secondary school context nonetheless still exist with all their
force and reasoning for the higher education context." 55 Hence, while
a state may have no duty to provide institutions of higher learning, nor
compel attendance by its citizens, if a state chooses to enter the arena
of higher education by providing state supported colleges and universities,
then it has a duty under the equal protection clause to treat all of its
citizens the same without regard to race. This includes an affirmative
duty "to take the necessary steps 'to eliminate from the public schools
all vestiges of state-imposed segregation." ''56
52. See, e.g., Geier v. Alexander (Geier I1), 801 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1986); Geier v.
University of Tennessee (Geier 1), 597 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886,
100 S. Ct. 180 (1979); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 453 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1971);
Norris v. State Council of Higher Educ. for Virginia, 327 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va.),
aff'd sub nom (per curiam without written opinion). Board of Visitors of the College of
William and Mary in Virginia v. Norris, 404 U.S. 907, 92 S. Ct. 227 (1971).
53. In Geier 1, 597 F.2d at 1065, the Sixth Circuit stated: "We conclude that the
Green requirement of an affirmative duty applies to public higher education as well as
to education at the elementary and secondary school levels." In Geier II, the Sixth Circuit,
quoting the above language from Geier I, found that Tennessee had an affirmative duty
to dismantle its prior de jure dual system of higher eduction. In Lee, 453 F.2d at 527,
the Fifth Circuit stated: "It is the responsibility of state authorities to eliminate the racial
character of [its institutions of higher education] .... Failure or neglect will require further
judicial scrutiny and the consideration of additional remedies."
54. Geier I, 597 F.2d at 1065.
55. See United States v. State of Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. at 656 (E.D. La. 1988).
56. See Milliken v. Bradly (Milliken I1), 433 U.S. 267, 289-90, 97 S. Ct. 2749, 2762
(1977) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S.
Ct. 1267, 1275 (1971)).
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"Freedom of Choice"
As stated, it has been suggested by others that the courts should
not apply the standards of Brown to higher education. Rather, they
argue that the proper standard to be applied is the "freedom of choice"
standard the U.S. Supreme Court approved in Alabama State Teachers
Association v. Alabama Public School and College Authority (ASTA)5 7
and Bazemore v. Friday.8 In Bazemore, black employees and the United
States brought an action against the North Carolina Agricultural Ex-
tension Service alleging a pattern and practice of racial discrimination.
The Extension Service operated 4-H clubs for youths in the community
schools. Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the clubs were designated
as "white only" or "black only." The 4-H clubs provided their members
with educational materials and training in various areas of agriculture
and home economics. The clubs met during regular school hours. By
a five to four decision, 9 the Court, noting that membership in the clubs
was voluntary, and there were no rules prohibiting any one from joining
any club of his choice, held that the racial identity of the clubs was
the result of "free choice" and that the Constitution did not require
more.
The majority distinguished the circumstances in Bazemore from those
in Green v. Board of New Kent County,6° in which the Court had held
that "voluntary" choice programs in public schools were inadequate and
that the schools had to take affirmative actions to integrate their student
bodies. The Bazemore Court stated that "[wihile school children must
go to school, there is no compulsion to join 4-H or Homemaker Clubs,
and while School Boards customarily have the power to create school
attendance areas and otherwise designate the school that particular stu-
dents may attend, there is no statutory or regulatory authority to deny
a young person the right to join any Club he or she wishes to join. '61
While there have been no U.S. Supreme Court decisions that have
applied the Bazemore standard to institutions of higher education, some
lower courts have done So. 62 One such case is the recently reversed
57. 289 F. Supp. 784 (M.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd mem., 393 U.S. 400, 89 S. Ct. 681
(1969).
58. 478 U.S. 385, 106 S. Ct. 3000 (1986).
59. Id. at 407, 106 S. Ct. at 3012.
60. 391 U.S. 430, 88 S. Ct. 1689 (1968).
61. Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 408, 106 S. Ct. at 3013.
62. See, e.g., Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523 (N.D. Miss. 1987), reversed, 893
F.2d 732 (1990); ASTA supra; Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(per curiam, en banc) (suggesting that the existance of all black public colleges is not
only unconstitutionally permissible, but also crucial for the viable training of minority
students).
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decision in Ayers v. Allain.63 In this case the United States alleged that
the State of Mississippi had established, maintained, and perpetuated a
racially separate system of public higher education for its black and
white citizens. The institutions, which had formerly been designated to
serve only blacks, were markedly inferior to the institutions established
to serve whites only. Although these schools now have a "freedom of
choice" admissions policy, the plaintiff alleged that the state continued
to maintain and perpetuate an unlawful dual system of higher education
because the previously "black only" institutions had remained predom-
inantly black and the previously "white only" institutions had remained
predominantly white.
The district court made note of the fact that the State of Mississippi
had instituted racially neutral admission standards for all of its univer-
sities and colleges. Citing ASTA and Bazemore, the court stated that
the scope of affirmative duty in higher education does not extend as
far as in elementary and secondary education and concluded that the
duty to disestablish or dismantle a dual higher education system is
fulfilled by the adoption and implementation of "good faith non-dis-
criminatory policies.'"'6
The Fifth Circuit rejected the district court's analysis65 under Baze-
more and adopted the Sixth Circuit's analysis in Geier stating that "[tihe
outcome in Bazemore may [] rest on the absence of evidence of dis-
crimination. In contrast, the record in the present case is replete with
the disease." ' 66 The distinction sustained by Bazemore is based on student
choice, or conversely, that students are not compelled to attend college.
It assumes that black students possess the same freedom to choose as
do white students. Contrary to Brown, however, this assumption ignores
the effects of past de jure segregation.67 Further, the Fifth Circuit noted
that the freedom of choice standard employed in Mississippi perpetuated
segregation because it made it easier for blacks to be admitted to a
black school and the historically white institution did not invite atten-
dance of blacks. The situation is the same in Louisiana. It is easier for
blacks to attend Southern Law Center because the admission standards
are not as tough as those at L.S.U. Law Center. At the same time,
blacks were not encouraged to attend L.S.U. 68
63. 674 F. Supp. 1523 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
64. Ayers, 674 F. Supp. at 1552.
65. Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1990).
66. Id. at 745.
67. Id. at 752.
68. The Fifth Circuit noted that admission was based on the ACT scores. A minimum
score of fifteen was required for automatic admission to historically white schools, while
only a minimum score of nine was needed for admission in historically black institutions.
A comparison of L.S.U. and Southern's admission standard is discussed above.
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"Freedom of Choice" is Not Enough
In considering the question of liability, the court in Louisiana v.
United States considered the standards of both Brown and Bazemore.
The court noted that there is a dispute over whether the scope of the
duties in higher education is as broad as has been defined and applied
in the context of elementary and secondary schools. It realized that
some courts have found states to have satisfied their duties in higher
education by implementing good faith, racially neutral policies and prac-
tices whereby students are free to enroll where they wish, even where
there continued to exist racially identifiable institutions within the state's
system of higher education. On the other hand, it noted that some
courts have required more. 69
In Geier v. Alexander,70 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
approval of a consent decree using racial quotas for certain student
recruitment in a university desegregation suit.
Rejecting the argument that Green does not control higher education
because the decision to attend is voluntary, the court, quoting Geier,
in United States v. State of Louisiana explained:
It appears fallacious to attempt to extend Bazemore to any level
of education. While membership in 4-H and Homemaker Clubs
offers a valuable experience to young people and families, par-
ticularly in rural areas, it cannot be compared to the value of
an advanced education. The importance of education to the
individual and the interest of the state in having its young people
educated as completely as possible indicate clearly that the hold-
ing in Green rather than that of Bazemore applies .... Nothing
in the Bazemore decision, where the compelling interest of a
state in the education of its citizenry was not involved requires
us to reexamine these holdings. 7
It is true that states are not required by the U.S. Constitution to
establish and maintain public institutions of higher education. However,
if a state chooses to create and maintain such institutions, it must
administer them without regard to race.72
69. See, e.g., Geier I, 597 F.2d 1056, 1067 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 886,
100 S. Ct. 180 (1979) and Norris v. State Council of Higher Educ. for Virginia, 327 F.
Supp. 1368, 1372 (E.D. Va.), aff'd sub nom (per curiam without written opinion). Board
of Visitors of the College of William and Mary in Virginia v. Norris, 404 U.S. 907, 92
S. Ct. 227 (1971).
70. 801 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1986).
71. United States v. State of Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642, 655 (E.D. La. 1988)
(quoting Geier 11, 801 F.2d 799, 805 (6th Cir. 1986)).
72. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).
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The State of Louisiana has chosen to create the law schools at
L.S.U. and Southern University. However, it has failed to administer
them without regard to race. As mentioned earlier, the Southern Law
Center is and has been controlled by the Southern Board of Supervisors,
which has a black majority, and the L.S.U. Law Center is and has
been controlled by the L.S.U. Board of Supervisors, which has a white
majority. L.S.U. has remained basically a one race school since the
official recognition by the state as a "white only" school was removed
from the state statutes.
The state has put forth little effort to increase enrollment of minority
students at L.S.U. It has, in recent years, attempted to affirmatively
recruit black applicants, an effort that was aided by minority tuition
waivers. In 1988, the state appropriated funds for minority tuition
waivers in an effort to recruit minority students. However, this was
done only after the district court had found that Louisiana was in
violation of the Consent Decree and had failed to dismantle its dual
higher educational system.
Southern, on the other hand is basically integrated in terms of
student population and faculty. However, Southern's undergraduate stu-
dent body population and faculty has remained predominantly black.
This indicates that the racially balanced student body of Southern Law
Center is more a result of Southern's relaxed admission standards than
on the equality of the two schools. In other words, whites that attend
Southern do so because it is easier to get in, not because they consider
the law school at Southern equal to the law school at L.S.U.
Another glaring statistic indicating that the two institutions are not
of equal quality is the bar passage rate of each school. Graduates of
L.S.U. law school have consistently led the state in bar passage (ap-
proximately 90%), while Southern graduates have consistently been last
in the state in bar passage (consistently under 50%). Even this disparity
may understate the reality faced by black students at Southern. As the
district court found, "[tihe Southern bar passage rate is probably in-
fluenced by the higher success rate of its white students." However,
even the passage rate of Southern's white students is not as high as
L.S.U.'s. 71 This pattern has existed for quite some time; nevertheless,
the state has failed to rectify the situation. No one would expect that
the bar passage rates would be exactly equal. It should be expected,
however, that if the law schools at Southern and L.S.U. were substan-
tially equal in the quality of legal education provided, the end result
(bar passage rates) would be similar.
73. Report, supra note 9, at 97, n.28.
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Remedy
Education is a matter entrusted initially to elected local authorities
and appointed state authorities. Even after unlawful segregation has been
found, responsibility falls initially on the local school authorities to
remedy the effects of this segregation. 74 Only the default of the state
and school authorities obligates the court to employ the help of appointed
experts and masters to establish an adequate plan of its own. Once the
court finds that the defendants have been operating an unlawful dual
system of education, the court is obligated to remedy this wrong. An
abiding concern must be to assure that minority students are afforded
an equal opportunity to get an education.
According to the provisions of the 1981 decree, a goal was set to
equate the proportion of qualified black Louisiana residents who grad-
uate from undergraduate institutions in the state and enter state graduate
and professional schools with the proportion of qualified white state
residents who graduate from state institutions and enter state graduate
and professional schools. 75 The public institutions of higher education
had committed themselves to actively recruit other-race students to in-
crease their percentage enrollment in student populations. During the
six-year existence of the decree, however, there was only a 1% increase
of other-race students at L.S.U. 76 In discussing the failure to attain the
goals of the Consent Decree, the court specifically pointed to L.S.U.'s
Law Center. It stated, "During the period of the consent decree, [the
percentage of black students] ranged.from 1.9 percent to 0.8 percent.
In 1988, it was only three percent." 77
The goal of the court in a desegregation case is to eliminate state-
imposed isolation of minorities within the school system. The remedy
must convert a 'dual' system to one without a white school and a
[black] school, but just schools." ' 78 The remedy should eliminate con-
ditions likely to produce racially identifiable schools. It must go beyond
an order that forbids further acts of affirmative discrimination in order
to assure that the past discriminatory practices will work no further
harm.
79
The district court, in the case at hand, imposed a plan that consists
of a racially conscious remedy in conjunction with a merger of the two
law schools.
74. Brown v. Board of Education (Brown H1), 349 U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753 (1955).
75. Report, supra note 9, at 4.
76. The overall percentage of other-race students increased from 23.6%y0 to 24.5%.
See Report, supra note 9, at 13.
77. 718 F. Supp. at 513.
78. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 230 (D. Mass. 1975).
79. Id. at 231.
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Racially Conscious Remedies
The effects of past discrimination in the school system will not go
away on their own. Without promotional quotas, the continuing effects
cannot be eliminated.80 Historically, policies that ignore race can have
the effect of perpetuating the effects of the past segregation practices.8
The desegregation remedy must therefore offer more than superficial
neutrality. It has to meet and neutralize the effects of past discrimination.
Courts have stressed that a desegregation remedy must do more than
give effect to the free choice of students when the effect of these choices
is simply to maintain the segregation of the past. 82
However, as the Supreme Court has recently reminded us, race
conscious remedies are disfavored. Before a racially conscious remedy
can be imposed, it must be determined that there is a compelling state
interest. One must then look to several factors, including: the necessity
of the relief and the efficacy of an alternative remedy; the flexibility
and duration of the relief, including the availability of waiver provisions;
the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant student population;
and the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties. 83 The use of
racial quotas must remain subject to continuing scrutiny to assure that
it will work the least harm possible to other "innocent" persons com-
peting for the benefit.
Compelling State Interest
Societal discrimination alone is insufficient to justify the use of race-
conscious remedies. Some showing of prior discrimination on the part
of the defendant is required before such remedies are allowed. In Sheet
Metal Workers International Association v. EEOC,s4 the Supreme Court
noted that the sheet metal union had a long history of discriminating
against nonwhites. 5 The union had been sued by the EEOC several
times. The Court stated, "In light of the [union's] long history of 'foot
80. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 163, 107 S. Ct. 1053, 1063 (1987).
81. Green v. Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 440, 88 S. Ct. 1689, 1695
(1968).
82. Morgan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 231. See also Green, 391 U.S. at 440, 88 S. Ct. at
1695; Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450, 88 S. Ct. 1700 (1968).
83. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 471, 107 S. Ct. at 1067.
84. 478 U.S. 421, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986).
85. In 1964, the New York State Commission for Human Rights determined that
Local 28 was excluding nonwhites. It had never included any black or Jewish members.
Admission to the union was conducted largely on non-work related factors, including a
nepotistic basis, requiring sponsorship by an incumbent union member. The union was
ordered to cease their racially discriminatory practices. See State Commission for Human
Rights v. Farrell, 43 Misc. 2d 958, 252 N.Y.S.2d 649 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964). In 1965 the
Commission had to bring charges to enforce the 1964 court order. Subsequent actions
were filed by the Commission in 1965, 1966, and 1967. Finally in 1971, the United States
stepped in and brought federal charges against the union.
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dragging resistance' to court orders, simply enjoining [the union] from
once again engaging in discriminatory practices would clearly have been
futile. Rather, the [d]istrict [clourt properly determined that affirmative
race-conscious measures were necessary to put an end to petitioners'
discriminatory ways. 86
This principle was again recognized in University of California Re-
gents v. Bakke.17 Bakke, a white male, had been denied admission to
medical school. He contended that he was denied the opportunity to
compete for all the positions because of a voluntary action program
initiated by the university. Justice Powell, speaking for the Court, held
that after a court has determined that there is a violation of constitutional
rights of a suspect class, then the government's interest in preferring
members of the injured group at the expense of others is substantial,
especially since the legal rights of the victims must be vindicated."8
In Brown, the Court stated, "To separate blacks from others of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates
feelings of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way that is unlikely ever to be
undone.' '89
Necessity
In order to justify the use of suspect classification, it must be shown
not only that the purpose and interest of the state is both constitutionally
permissible and substantial, but also that its use of the classification is
necessary to the accomplishment of its purpose or the safeguarding of
its interest. 90 In this case, the racial quota purports to insure that there
is a significant attempt by the merged law school to recruit and retain
blacks. This requirement is necessary in light of the negative past history
of L.S.U. in attracting and retaining blacks at its law school. It had
been the policy and law of Louisiana from the time the law school was
established in 1906 until the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
that blacks would not be allowed to attend L.S.U. Since the decision
in Brown, the State of Louisiana and the law school at L.S.U. have
done very little to change the policy even though the law prohibiting
the attendance of blacks has been removed from the books.
It has also been shown that the freedom of choice policy that has
been in effect in Louisiana has failed to achieve the desired result of
eliminating the racial identity of the law schools. This is true even if
86. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 477, 106 S. Ct. at 3050.
87. 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
88. 438 U.S. at 305, 98 S. Ct. at 2756.
89. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493, 74 S. Ct. at 691.
90. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
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the racial makeup of Southern Law Center is considered. Although
Southern Law Center's student body is roughly 420 white, this can be
explained by the fact that the admission standards at Southern are not
as stringent as those at L.S.U. Law Center. This means that the high
percentage of whites at Southern Law Center is not so much a result
of the freedom of choice admission policy as it is a result of the lower
admission standards at Southern. However, the opposite cannot be said
for the blacks at L.S.U. Law Center. Assuming that they meet the
requirements for admission at L.S.U., then they automatically meet the
requirements for admission at Southern, because the admission standards
are higher at L.S.U. Therefore, the decision of those blacks that attend
L.S.U. is truly a "free choice" because they could have attended either
school that they wanted to attend.
Narrowly Tailored Remedy
The scope of a remedy is determined by the nature and extent of
the constitutional violation. A race-conscious remedy is narrowly tailored
to remedy past discrimination if its implementation results, or is designed
to result, in the admission of a sufficient number of minority students
so that the racial balance of the student body approximates roughly the
balance that would have been achieved absent the past discrimination. 91
The racially conscious remedy imposed by the court in United States
v. Louisiana is designed to accomplish this goal. However, one may
suspect that the 10% minority quota is too low. According to the Special
Masters Report, Louisiana's population is approximately 29% black.
Blacks also represent 28076 of the total students entering college in any
given year. 92 The data compiled also indicates that only about 33.2%
of all the students, black and white, that enter college graduate within
six years. There was no data on the percentage of blacks that graduate
in comparison to whites. Assuming that the percentages are consistent,
then the percentage of blacks that are qualified to attend law school in
any given year would still be 28%. Therefore, while the court had a
good idea in imposing the racial quota, it did not go far enough.
One must also look at the effect that a racially conscious remedy
would have on "innocent parties." The "innocent parties" in this case
will be those non-minority students that will not be admitted to the
newly merged law school in any given year because of the quota. This
does not entail a serious disruption of their lives because the student
is not losing anything that he had a vested right in, and therefore, the
91. See id. at 279, 106 S. Ct. at 1850 and compare with Valentine v. Smith, 654
F.2d 503, 510 (8th Cir. 1981).
92. Report, supra note 9, at 15-17.
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remedy is permissible. 93 In other words, as long as no student is being
removed from a position that he has been granted in order to make
room for a minority, racial quotas are permissible. 94 Instead, that student
is being postponed or encouraged to apply to another law school. In
United States v. Paradise,95 the United States Supreme Court approved
a desegregation plan ordered by the district court that required the State
of Alabama to hire and promote their state troopers on a one to one
ratio until blacks represented 25% of the state troopers. The Court
looked at the fact that no white trooper was being fired to make room
for black troopers. Also, no whites were being denied a promotion
because of the order. Their promotions were only being postponed.
Another requirement of a racially conscious remedy is that it be
flexible. The plan called for by the court in United States v. Louisiana
did not mention any flexibility. However, if it can be shown that the
newly merged law school has a legitimate reason for not living up to
the requirements of the order, 96 the court will probably not penalize it
as long as there has been a good faith attempt to satisfy the requirements.
Besides, quotas should not be etched in stone. There will be some years
when there will not be enough qualified applicants to reach the quota.
This will be acceptable if, in years when there are more qualified
applicants than the quota requires, more than the quota calls for are
admitted.
Racially Conscious Remedy Alone Did Not Work
The Consent Decree stated that the L.S.U. Law Center would strive
to reach a minimum of 7.5% minority students by 1988. L.S.U. did
not even come close. One of the reasons could be a lack of effort on
behalf of L.S.U. A substantially equal reason can be traced to the
existence of a public black law school across town, which attracts blacks
because of social pressures and the general feeling based upon historical
fact that they are not welcome at L.S.U. Law Center.
Unless there is some incentive to go elsewhere, students will usually
attend the institution that their parents attended because of tradition
and they will normally feel comfortable there. While it is true that
L.S.U. has had scholarships available to those students that were fi-
nancially unable to attend law school, minority students attending L.S.U.
have to compete with other non-minority students for these scholarships.
There is nothing wrong with blacks having to compete with whites for
93. See Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986); Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 107
S. Ct. 1053 (1987).
94. Cf. Wygant, 476 U.S. 267, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
95. 480 U.S. 149, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987).
96. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 177, 107 S. Ct. at 1070.
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scholarships; however, in light of the L.S.U. Law Center's lack of success
in attracting black students, scholarships exclusively for minorities would
provide an incentive for blacks to attend. It was not until the Fall of
1988 that the L.S.U. Law Center initiated scholarships aimed at recruiting
minority students. This was done, however, after the district court had
declared that the L.S.U. Law Center along with the rest of Louisiana's
higher education system was in violation of the Supreme Court mandate
not to operate a dual system. Even with the scholarships, other measures
are needed.97
The Merger
By merging the law schools at Southern and L.S.U., the court has
accomplished the goal of eliminating conditions likely to produce racially
identifiable schools. Some might say that the merger was not necessary
in this case. However, given the lack of success of the "freedom of
choice" policy on admissions in Louisiana, and the unlikelihood that
any other method would succeed, the merger is the only means of
accomplishing this goal. As the court noted on August 4, 1989, a "court's
power to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are
inherent in equitable power."19 8
This flexibility regarding remedies has been especially recognized in
the context of legal education. Almost forty years ago in Sweatt, the
Supreme Court recognized that a state's predominantly white law school
might possess a far greater number of those qualities that make for
greatness in a law school than a state's predominately black law school.
These qualities, which are beyond objective measurement, include the
reputation of the faculty, the position and influence of alumni, and the
prestige of the school. The same immeasurable qualities that the Court
in Sweatt found were possessed by the University of Texas, but not by
Texas Southern University, are also possessed by L.S.U., but not by
Southern.
One way to measure the success of a school is to examine the
placement of its graduates. The L.S.U. Law Center places 89% of its
graduates within six to nine months of graduation. Twelve percent of
those graduates are placed with large law firms; 39% with small to
medium law firms; 2% with corporations and businesses; 17% in gov-
ernmental employment; 25% with judicial clerkships; 2076 with solo
practice; and 20% find other types of employment. Starting salaries
97. See the discussion of Sheet Metal Workers, supra text accompanying notes 84-
86.
98. United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 525, 534 (E.D. La. 1989).
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range from $20,000 to $105,000 with an average salary of $31,200 per
year. 99
Southern, on the other hand, places 5076 of its graduates in gov-
ernmental service. Another 20% are placed with public-service and pub-
lic-interest organizations, and 20% go into solo practice. The remaining
10% is split with 3076 taking judicial clerkships and 7% taking other
employment. Starting salaries range from $15,000 to $38,000 with an
average starting salary of $18,000.10
Another of those immeasurable qualities that make for greatness in
a law school is the reputation of the faculty. While both Southern and
L.S.U. have good teaching instructors, the faculty at L.S.U. enjoys a
greater reputation. Also, L.S.U. faculty members head the Center of
Civil Law Studies and the Louisiana State Law Institute, both of which
are located at the L.S.U. Law Center.
Where the extent of the constitutional deprivation is great and other
milder remedies have failed, courts have found the merger of educational
institutions to be appropriate.' 0' In Geier v. Blanton,102 there existed a
predominantly black institution and a predominantly white institution
in the same city. Tennessee State University (TSU) was initially estab-
lished under state statute as an institution for blacks only, whereas the
University of Tennessee was established for whites only. An action was
brought to enjoin the University of Tennessee-Nashville from constructing
a proposed expansion. The plaintiffs argued that the proposed expansion
would affect the efforts of TSU to desegregate its student body and
faculty. In response, the court ordered the defendants to submit a plan
to desegregate both the black and white institutions. The submitted plan
called for the white institutions to recruit black students and faculty
and for the black institutions to recruit white students and faculty. After
the plan had been in effect for eight years the court concluded that it
had not worked and showed no prospect of working. The court then
ordered the merger of TSU and UT-N.
The Geier court was concerned with whether it had surpassed the
bounds of its broad remedial powers by ordering a merger, especially
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Austin Independent School
District v. United States.103 In Austin, the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals approval of a requirement
of extensive cross-town busing to achieve a certain degree of racial
balance in every school. The Supreme Court held that the lower court
99. E. Epstein, J. Shostak & L. Troy, Barron's Guide to Law Schools, 136 (8th ed.
1988).
100. Id. at 175.
101. See Geier v. Blanton, 427 F. Supp. 644 (M.D. Tenn. 1977).
102. Id.
103. 429 U.S. 990, 97 S. Ct. 517 (1976).
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had abused its remedial powers, which may only be used (1) in the face
of a constitutional violation and which, if used, (2) may not exceed the
effect of the constitutional violation. In ruling that the merger had met
this standard the court in Geier stated:
In the initial stages of this case, the first criterion was met: the
establishment by State statute of a dual system of higher edu-
cation was a blatant constitutional violation. The second criterion
has also been met: merger does not exceed what is necessary
to eliminate the effect of the statutory scheme. Eight years under
the State's method is proof that a stronger remedy is required.
Certainly, it cannot be argued that TSU would be overwhelm-
ingly black today if it had not been established as an institution
for [N]egroes. Merger is a drastic remedy, but the State's actions
have been egregious examples of constitutional violations.1°4
The facts surrounding United States v. Louisiana are analogous to
the facts in Geier. There is no dispute that the State of Louisiana once
operated a de jure dual system of education at all levels including higher
education. The jurisprudence has stated that this is a "blatant consti-
tutional violation," thereby meeting the first criterion as established by
the Geier court.
The second criterion, that the remedy not exceed the effects of the
violation, has also been met. Here, as in Geier, the state was given an
opportunity to eliminate the effects of the prior de jure dual system.
This litigation has been pending since 1974. A Consent Decree was
entered into in an attempt to settle the dispute. After six years under
the decree, the racial identity of the institutions had remained unchanged.
In some instances, the situation had become worse. Surely the state has
had the opportunity to solve the problem but has failed to do so. A
stronger solution is needed to remedy the efforts of the racially iden-
tifiable dual system of legal education in -Louisiana.
Following the August 2, 1988 decision, the Court ordered that
proposed remedial plans be submitted by each party. The State of
Louisiana's plan included an aggressive provision to eliminate program
duplication. It called for academic transfers and exclusive assignment
of high demand programs. The state hoped that by exclusively assigning
certain programs to one school, students wishing to study that particular
field would have no choice but to attend that school rather than being
able to choose between a predominantly black institution and a pre-
dominantly white institution.105 The United States, as well as Southern,
104. Geier, 427 F. Supp. at 660.
105. Report, supra note 9, at 24.
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also recommended program transfers and exclusive assignment of some
programs to one or the other school in the same area.' °6
Merging Southern Law Center with L.S.U. Law Center will have
the same effect. Southern University will still exist. However, students
wishing to study law at a state supported school will have to attend
the newly merged law school instead of choosing between Southern and
L.S.U. This is no different from exclusively assigning a particular pro-
fessional or graduate program, such as pharmacy or chemistry, to one
or the other school.
How Will the Merger Be Implemented
A major concern of those who oppose the merger as well as those
in favor of the merger is how it will be implemented. What will be the
standards at the new merged school? If the admission requirements are
not lowered, how will it affect those students, which are mostly minority,
who cannot meet those admission requirements? Is this just another way
of wiping out minority lawyers? Can L.S.U. be trusted to admit and
retain minorities? The district court failed to give any guidance on
implementation other than to say that it is to take place over a five-
year period.
One of the views that has been discussed is the establishment of a
two-tier admission criteria. Those applicants that are able to meet the
regular requirements will be admitted for a regular program with the
attendant first year course requirements. Those applicants that are not
able to meet the regular academic requirements but still demonstrate
the potential to complete law school will be selectively admitted. These
students will be allowed to progress through the law school curriculum
at a slower pace. The exit standards to graduate will be the same for
both sets of applicants, thereby maintaining the present status of the
school in the legal community.
Another idea is to simply have an admission standard that is some-
where between what the two schools now have. Some might think that
this will lower the status that L.S.U. has worked so hard to achieve.
This will not be the case if the exit standards are maintained. L.S.U.
did not earn its reputation on the quality of its entering freshmen, but
on the quality of its graduating lawyers. As long as the academic standard
for the student while he is in law school is the same, this reputation
will not change.
A second concern is what will happen to those students that are
not able to meet the admission requirements (whatever they may be) of
the newly merged law school? Undoubtedly, some of those students will
be minority students. However, the court order did specify that 10%
106. Id. at 27, 31.
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of the spaces are to be reserved for minority students, some of which
will not meet the regular admission requirements.
This court order is not a method of wiping out black lawyers. In
effect, what it will do is instill in the mind of the public that all of
the lawyers who are educated in Louisiana law schools are equally
qualified to practice law. Law firms that interview for jobs will be more
inclined to hire minorities than they are now, which will result in
comparable entry level positions for both black and white lawyers.
Finally, it is contended that L.S.U. cannot be trusted to admit and
retain black law students. The court was concerned with this and ordered
that a monitoring committee be established to see to it that all of its
orders were being implemented. However, the order only called for the
admission of blacks to the law school. Once blacks have been admitted,
they will have to compete on the same level as the whites there for
grades. L.S.U., or any school for that matter, does not owe blacks or
any other race a guarantee that they will graduate. A degree must be
earned.
CONCLUSION
In cases involving higher education, an open door policy, coupled
with good faith recruiting efforts, as well as provisions for remedial
education for the educationally underprivileged, is sufficient as a basic
requirement to eliminate the vestiges of former dejure systems. However,
this basic requirement is not enough in those situations in which it fails
to accomplish the ends sought. Stronger remedies are required.
In the case at hand, the basic requirements surely have failed to
accomplish the goals set out under the Consent Decree. Something more
was desperately needed. The court, sensing this need for a stronger
remedy, took the appropriate steps to solve the problem of unequal
legal education in the State of Louisiana. The case has now been passed
to the Fifth Circuit. They have the opportunity to settle the issue of
what role the states are to take in desegregating their systems of higher
education. Reversing this decision will have the effect of sending this
nation back to the days of "separate but unequal."
Darrell K. Hickman
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Year
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989 (May & August)
TOTAL
L.S.U. Law Center
Graduates
1971-Present
Total Graduates
132
164
238
291
254
285
293
282
260
216
202
221
212
195
206
186
187
218
185
4227
L.S.U.
Black Enrollment
1971-Present
Total
Blacks
Enrolled
34
24
11
9
14
12
10
12
15
27
15
16
13
25
21
19
14
6
7
304
4%
3%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%1%
I%
3%
1%
1%
1%2%
2%
1%
I%
.7%
.7%
1.9%
Blacks
0
0
1
4
4
2
7
4
3
1
4
9
3
1
4
1
5
2
0
55
Year
Fall '89
Fall '88
Fall '87
Fall '86
Fall '85
Fall '84
Fall '83
Fall '82
Fall '81
Fall '80
Fall '79
Fall '78
Fall '77
Fall '76
Fall '75
Fall '74
Fall '73
Fall '72
Fall '71
TOTAL
Total
Enrollment
783
783
711
723
718
689
737
807
879
857
863
890
989
1023
1038
953
943
855
916
16,157
Total
Freshmen
315
372
267
285
306
250
301
354
374
376
376
334
371
386
407
377
369
315
498
6,633
Total
Black
Freshmen
25
23
9
2
7
7
5
6
3
14
10
9
7
14
12
12
7
1
6
179
7%
6%
3%
.7%
2%
2%
1%
1%
.8%
3%
2%
2%
1%
3%
2%
3%
I%
.3%
.1%
2.7%
1990]

